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LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxon); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor of Law, School of Law; 
DS Lee Foundation Fellow, 
Singapore Management University. 
Introduction 
23.1 In 2016, there were nine cases that substantively discussed the 
law of unjust enrichment and restitution. Most of the cases concerned a 
claim for restitution for unjust enrichment, with focus on the “unjust 
factor” inquiry. Two cases are of note. In Singapore Swimming Club v 
Koh Sin Chong Freddie1 (“Singapore Swimming Club”), a claim in unjust 
enrichment was advanced on the basis of mistake of fact. As the case 
concerned an unincorporated association, the dispute belied a difficult 
issue concerning whose mistake was relevant and the further issue of 
attribution of state of mind. In AAHG LLC v Hong Hin Kay Albert2 
(“AAHG”), the High Court endorsed, without elaboration, “lack of 
consent”, a controversial ground of restitution, as an unjust factor under 
Singapore law. 
23.2 It is also noteworthy that three cases concerned benefits 
(payment and performance of services) conferred in anticipation of a 
contract that did not materialise. These anticipated contracts cases 
raised interesting issues concerning enrichment and the relevant unjust 
factor. In particular, the Court of Appeal in Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong 
Soh Chin3 (“Cheong Soh Chin”) discussed the conceptual divide between 
the implied contract approach and the unjust enrichment analysis, 
bringing certainty to a complex area of the law. 
Contract and unjust enrichment 
23.3 In Verona Capital Pty Ltd v Ramba Energy West Jambi Ltd,4 the 
High Court affirmed that where a benefit has been conferred as a result 
of a valid and existing contract between the parties, no claim in unjust 
                                                                        
1 [2016] 3 SLR 845. 
2 [2017] 3 SLR 636. 
3 [2016] 4 SLR 728. 
4 [2016] SGHC 55. 
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enrichment can arise.5 This is because the law of unjust enrichment 
cannot be invoked to undermine the parties’ contractual allocation of 
risks.6 
23.4 For this reason, the law of unjust enrichment is said to be 
subsidiary to the law of contract.7 Nevertheless, this is not to say, as a 
blanket rule, that contractual invalidity is a prerequisite to a claim in 
unjust enrichment. As Burrows has explained in The law of Restitution,8 
one must consider whether on the particular facts of the dispute, the 
contractual allocation of risks is undermined by the law of unjust 
enrichment. It may be that on the facts, there is no inconsistency 
between contract and unjust enrichment. In Burrows’ analysis, this is 
readily illustrated by failure of consideration cases.9 
Terminology: Quantum meruit 
23.5 In Cheong Soh Chin, the plaintiffs claimed for payment for 
services rendered to the defendants on the basis of an implied contract 
and, alternatively, in restitutionary quantum meruit. The Court of 
Appeal noted that the monetary award made on either basis would be a 
reasonable sum and such a quantum would, thus, be “consistent with the 
literal meaning of the term ‘quantum meruit’, which translated from the 
Latin [sic] means ‘as much as he has deserved’” [emphasis in original].10 
23.6 The court observed that a claim for a reasonable sum for work 
done on the basis of an implied contract has been referred to as 
contractual quantum meruit.11 However, the court went on to stress that 
contractual quantum meruit is conceptually distinct from restitutionary 
quantum meruit, a distinction that is well-established in Singapore case 
law. Having regard to leading commentaries on the subject, the court 
was of the view that the label “quantum meruit” would more 
appropriately describe the claim in unjust enrichment.12 To avoid 
                                                                        
5 Verona Capital Pty Ltd v Ramba Energy West Jambi Ltd [2016] SGHC 55 at [84]–[86]. 
6 Verona Capital Pty Ltd v Ramba Energy West Jambi Ltd [2016] SGHC 55 at [86]. 
7 See Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) ch 6, at p 134. 
8 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) 
ch 14, at pp 328–329. 
9 See especially Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 
208 CLR 516; Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Simone Degeling & James 
Edelman eds) (Thomson Reuters, 2008) ch 1; cf, Tang Hang Wu, “Unjust 
Enrichment within a Valid Contract: A Close Look at Roxborough v Rothmans of 
Pall Mall Australia Ltd” (2007) 23 Journal of Contract Law 201. 
10 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [37]. 
11 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [37]. 
12 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [38] and [41]. 
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confusion, the “most practical and commonsensical approach”, according 
to the court, is to focus on the substance of the claim, as opposed to 
the form.13 
Remuneration for work done: Implied contract versus restitutionary 
quantum meruit 
23.7 The terminology of “contractual quantum meruit” and 
“restitutionary quantum meruit” was discussed at length in Cheong Soh 
Chin because the dispute concerned the basis of remuneration for work 
done where the parties had not executed a formal contract. The 
background facts and the High Court’s ruling were examined in a 
previous review.14 In essence, the plaintiffs and the defendants entered 
into a funds business joint venture, named the “WWW concept”. There 
was an agreement between the parties for the payment of management 
fees by the plaintiffs to the defendants in respect of the initial PE funds. 
There was, however, no agreement made regarding the payment of 
management fees in relation to the additional PE funds as well as five 
direct investments, including one hotel project (“Project Plaza”) 
undertaken by the defendants. The initial PE funds, the additional PE 
funds, as well as the direct investments were held through special 
purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) controlled by the defendants but set up with 
the plaintiffs’ funds. 
23.8 The joint venture failed to take off and the parties’ personal and 
professional relationships broke down. The plaintiffs commenced 
proceedings to demand the defendants to transfer to them the investments 
and the control of the SPVs. The defendants counterclaimed for 
management fees and expenses incurred in relation to the investments 
over the years. The appeal before the Court of Appeal concerned the 
defendants’ counterclaim for management fees. The defendants’ 
counterclaim was substantially dismissed in entirety by the High Court. 
The High Court found that the parties had undertaken the WWW 
concept as joint risk-runners, expecting to receive rewards only when 
the joint venture came to fruition. As such, the defendants were not 
entitled to payment of management fees, beyond what the management 
fees that had been agreed in respect of the initial PE funds. In this 
connection, the High Court found that Project Plaza was part of the 
WWW concept. 
23.9 The Court of Appeal, having carefully examined the evidence, 
disagreed with the High Court that Project Plaza was part of the WWW 
                                                                        
13 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [41]. 
14 (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 593 at 595–600, paras 23.5–23.18. 
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concept. It went on to find that the defendants had performed the work 
with “an (accompanying) expectation … that they would be separately 
remunerated” [emphasis in original] for Project Plaza.15 As such, the 
issue was whether the defendants were to be remunerated on the basis of 
an implied contract or on a quantum meruit for an anticipated contract 
which did not materialise. The court was of the view that it would be 
artificial to find that there was an implied contract to pay on the facts,16 
as an implied contract will only be found to have arisen in “very limited 
circumstances based on necessity and having regard to the intentions of 
the parties”.17 
23.10 The court also distinguished between remuneration on an 
implied contract basis and remuneration on an implied term basis.18 The 
latter concerns a scenario where there is an express contract between the 
parties that does not contain an express term on remuneration and the 
court is being asked to imply a term for payment of a reasonable sum. 
A term for payment of a reasonable sum will only be implied if it is 
necessary to do so by reference to the traditional tests on implication of 
terms. Further, it has been pointed out that in deciding whether 
remuneration should be made on an implied contract basis, courts 
should be alive to the commercial context.19 When business people 
negotiate, they do not contemplate the formation of small, discrete 
contracts, but a package contract that governs all their rights and 
liabilities. As such, in cases where the main contract do not materialise, 
courts should not be overly ready to imply that a smaller, discrete contract 
(governing remuneration of work done) has been formed. The facts of 
Cheong Soh Chin, however, did not concern the non-materialisation of a 
main contract. 
Enrichment 
23.11 To succeed in a cause of action in unjust enrichment, the 
plaintiff must show, amongst other elements, that the defendant has 
been enriched. This inquiry is straightforward where money is 
concerned, as it is the “quintessential example of an incontrovertible 
benefit”.20 It will be unreasonable or impossible for the defendant to 
dispute that he has been enriched by the receipt of money. He may, 
however, defend against the claim in unjust enrichment on other 
                                                                        
15 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [86]. 
16 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [86]. 
17 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [29]. 
18 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [30]. 
19 See Man Yip & Yihan Goh, “Liability for Work Done where Contract is Denied: 
Contractual and Restitutionary Approaches” [2012] LMCLQ 289. 
20 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [62]. 
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grounds, such as the lack of a recognised unjust factor or if relevant 
defences are applicable. 
23.12 Whether the receipt of pure services enriches a defendant is less 
clear-cut. To be clear, pure services have market value but the law 
respects people’s choices whether to pay for the service or not.21 The 
same goes for things that have market value. As Pollock CB made clear 
in Taylor v Laird:22 
… Suppose that I clean your property without your knowledge, have I 
then a claim on you for payment? How can you help it? One cleans 
another’s shoes; what can the other do but put them on? Is that 
evidence of a contract to pay for the cleaning? The benefit of the 
service could not be rejected without refusing the property itself … 
23.13 In Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel23 
(“Higgins”), the plaintiff claimed that he should be paid for the 
management of the defendants’ aircraft on the basis of an implied 
contract and, alternatively, in unjust enrichment. The said management 
services comprised: “(a) private flight services; (b) pilot training; 
(c) aircraft management services; and (d) aircraft registration services”.24 
23.14 The High Court ruled that the private flight services, on the 
evidence, had been paid for and the claim must, therefore, fail.25 In 
respect of the pilot training, the court held that where “a defendant 
informs a claimant that he does not wish to receive a benefit but the 
claimant nevertheless proceeds to confer the benefit anyway, the 
defendant is under no obligation to pay for it”.26 On the facts, the 
plaintiff informed one of the defendants via e-mail that he intended to 
send the pilot on a course and asked for a decision on the matter, failing 
which he would take the pilot off the course. The plaintiff did not 
receive an affirmative reply from the said defendant but he proceeded to 
put the pilot on the course. The court commented that there was no 
unjust factor for the claim. The claim could also be rejected on the basis 
that no enrichment was established because the defendant did not 
choose to pay for the service. The court further rejected the plaintiff ’s 
argument that he had “acted ‘reasonably’ in a situation of ‘urgency’” as 
the case did not involve an emergency that would justify restitution for 
                                                                        
21 See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2005) ch 3, 
at p 53. 
22 (1856) 25 LJ Ex 329 at 332. 
23 [2016] 5 SLR 848. 
24 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [55]. 
25 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [57]. 
26 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [58]. 
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“expenses incurred in the unsolicited management of the affairs of 
another”.27 
23.15 As for the aircraft management services, most of the items 
overlapped with the items claimed under pilot training and private 
flight services and should, accordingly, be dismissed for the same 
reasons that those claims were unsuccessful.28 The only item remaining 
was consultancy services and which the court swiftly dismissed too. The 
court considered the claim for consultancy services to be tantamount to 
seeking the recovery of remuneration under the oral alleged contract – 
the plaintiff ’s primary basis of recovery – that the court had already 
rejected. It said that the law of unjust enrichment is concerned with 
reversing benefits received by the defendant at the expense of the 
plaintiff; it is not concerned with enforcing a party’s expectation interest 
as that lies in the realm of contract.29 It is respectfully submitted that a 
contractual claim for remuneration which is unsuccessful does not 
automatically render a claim in unjust enrichment for remuneration to 
be unsuccessful too. Indeed, as recognised by the Court of Appeal in 
Cheong Soh Chin (discussed above at paras 23.5–23.6), both claims (also 
referred to as contractual quantum meruit and restitutionary quantum 
meruit respectively) are to seek recovery for “a reasonable sum” for work 
done. Indeed, in many cases, they are pleaded as alternative claims. The 
court should have gone on to explain why the restitutionary claim 
should also fail on the facts. 
23.16 Finally, in respect of aircraft registration services, the court said 
that the defendant had not been enriched as the plaintiff ’s efforts “came 
to naught”.30 The background facts to this particular head of claim are 
fairly straightforward. The defendants’ aircraft was originally registered 
in the US. Facing pressure from the US tax authorities in respect of the 
aircraft, the defendants accepted the plaintiff ’s proposal to fly the 
aircraft to Malaysia and have it registered in Malaysia instead. However, 
as it turned out, registration in Malaysia was not feasible in light of the 
costs and time the process would take. Efforts for registration in 
Malaysia were, thus, abandoned. The court acknowledged,31 citing the 
case of Brewer Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd32 
(“Brewer Street”), that enrichment may come in the form of a “pure 
service”, without “the attainment of a particular result or end-product”. 
In Brewer Street, the English Court of Appeal granted the plaintiff 
                                                                        
27 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [59]. 
28 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [60]. 
29 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [60]. 
30 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [61]–[62]. 
31 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [63]. 
32 [1954] 1 QB 428. 
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landlord’s claim in unjust enrichment in respect of alterations made to 
the property requested by the defendants at the time the parties were 
negotiating the lease of the property, even though the defendants did 
not, ultimately, take up the lease. 
23.17 In Higgins, the court was of the view that the defendants did not 
derive “any objective benefit” from the plaintiff ’s efforts in trying to 
register the aircraft in Malaysia for two main reasons. First, the court 
conceptualised the basis upon which the defendants undertook payment 
responsibility was that it was necessary for the aircraft to be re-registered 
in another jurisdiction.33 However, the court found that it was 
unnecessary for the aircraft to be deregistered from the US registry. 
Moreover, the court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff made no 
inquiries on the feasibility of the registration of the aircraft in Malaysia 
prior to his advising the defendants to proceed with his proposed plan. 
Overall, one gets a sense from the judgment that the court considered it 
unfair to require the defendants to pay the plaintiff for a pure service 
that was unnecessary, recommended to the defendants with no due 
diligence undertaken beforehand and one which yielded no result.34 To 
allow the plaintiff ’s claim would be tantamount to allowing the plaintiff 
to profit from his own default and lack of diligence. 
23.18 In Cheong Soh Chin, the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of 
quantification of enrichment. The court found that the defendants were 
entitled to restitutionary quantum meruit – a reasonable sum based on 
the principle of unjust enrichment – for work performed in anticipation 
of a contract which did not materialise.35 The issue of quantification was 
substantially dependent upon expert evidence on what would be a 
reasonable sum in the circumstances.36 Nevertheless, some principles 
may be extracted from the judgment. 
23.19 First, the contest between the expert evidence tendered by both 
sides was centred on what would be the objective market rate of the 
work performed by the defendants. Second, the valuation of the work 
performed by the defendants must take into account the nature of the 
project (whether it was a standard project or a unique, complex project), 
the role played by the defendants, the fact that the project was a 
“stillborn”, and that the project stretched beyond the projected period. 
                                                                        
33 Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 5 SLR 848 at [67]. 
34 See especially Higgins, Danial Patrick v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2016] 
5 SLR 848 at [70]. 
35 See paras 23.7–23.10 above. 
36 Eng Chiet Shoong v Cheong Soh Chin [2016] 4 SLR 728 at [87]–[92]. 
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23.20 Notably, before the Court of Appeal, neither the plaintiffs nor 
the defendants argued that the quantification ought to be different from 
the market rate, by the operation of either subjective devaluation or 
subjective re-evaluation. These arguments may, nevertheless, be relevant 
in other cases concerning payment for work done in respect of an 
anticipated contract. 
Unjust factor 
Lack of consent 
23.21 In AAHG, the plaintiff claimed compensation against the 
defendant for conversion of company shares in which the plaintiff had a 
reversionary interest. The shares were originally held by a company 
known as DVI Inc (“DVI”). Alternatively, the plaintiff advanced a claim 
for restitution in unjust enrichment. In that case, the defendant had 
procured the transfer of shares to himself, purportedly in pursuance to 
the exercise of a right of pre-emption. Pursuant to resolutions passed at 
the board of directors’ meeting, the shares held by DVI were cancelled 
and registered in the defendant’s name. The defendant, subsequently, 
transferred the shares to another company. 
23.22 The High Court found37 that the alleged right of pre-emption 
did not arise on the facts as DVI had not issued a transfer notice 
required under the Articles of Association for the transfer of shares. The 
required transfer notice would have operated as an offer to sell from a 
shareholder proposing to sell his shares to any member or selected 
person and triggers the right of pre-emption. 
23.23 The High Court concluded that the plaintiff could succeed on 
both conversion as well as its alternative claim in unjust enrichment. Of 
interest to this review is the High Court’s endorsement of “lack of 
consent” as an unjust factor to ground the restitutionary claim.38 
23.24 Notably, whilst aware of the Court of Appeal’s hesitation to 
endorse this controversial unjust factor in Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng 
Li-Ann Genevieve39 (“Anna Wee”), the High Court was quick to 
embrace, without full analysis of ensuing consequences, the unjust 
factor. According to the High Court:40 
                                                                        
37 AAHG LLC v Hong Hin Kay Albert [2017] 3 SLR 636 at [37]. 
38 AAHG LLC v Hong Hin Kay Albert [2017] 3 SLR 636 at [74]–[75]. 
39 [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [166]–[167]. 
40 AAHG LLC v Hong Hin Kay Albert [2017] 3 SLR 636 at [74]. 
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There is much force in the argument (which the Court of Appeal 
noted in Anna Wee at [139]) that if mistake (vitiation of consent) or 
failure of consideration (qualification of consent) can constitute unjust 
factors, the same conceptual justification must apply a fortiori where 
there is no consent. In my view, lack of consent ought to be recognised 
as an unjust factor. 
23.25 The concerns of the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee had been 
discussed in a previous review.41 In particular, it has been highlighted in 
that commentary that the recognition of “lack of consent” (alternatively 
known as “ignorance”) as an unjust factor has the effect of moving 
towards recognising strict liability for receipt of property transferred in 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty that are traditionally dealt with in 
equity under the doctrine of knowing receipt.42 Notably, in Singapore 
Swimming Club,43 the Court of Appeal also cautioned against 
recognising new grounds of recovery too freely.44 
23.26 The case of AAHG is going on appeal before the Court of 
Appeal. There is, therefore, opportunity to review this part of the High 
Court’s ruling. In this connection, it is worthwhile to note that two 
recent Australian decisions have cast doubt on the authority of the High 
Court of Australia’s ruling in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee 
Pty Ltd45 as being set against recognising strict liability for receipt 
cases.46 Indeed, in Great Investments Ltd v Warner,47 the Full Federal 
Court of Australia held that in cases of receipt of corporate assets 
transferred without authority, the principles of knowing receipt do not 
apply. The Full Federal Court of Australia held that the liability of the 
recipient to make restitution is strict. Leave to appeal the decision to the 
High Court of Australia had been denied. 
Mistake 
23.27 Two decisions in 2016 involved claims in unjust enrichment 
brought on the ground of mistake. The first was Singapore Swimming 
Club, a Court of Appeal decision, which raised issues such as what 
constitutes an operative mistake as well as whose mistake is relevant for 
the purpose of a claim in unjust enrichment. In that case, Koh Sin 
                                                                        
41 (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 471–472, para 22.19. 
42 See also (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 480–482, paras 22.41–22.44. 
43 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845; see below 
at paras 23.27–23.38 for a discussion on this case. 
44 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [93]. 
45 (2007) 230 CLR 89. 
46 See Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd [2016] NSWCA 81 and 
Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85. 
47 [2016] FCAFC 85. 
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Chong (“Koh”), the defendant, was the former president of the plaintiff, 
the Singapore Swimming Club (“Club”), an unincorporated association. 
He was previously sued by four members of the immediately preceding 
management committee for making defamatory statements against 
them. The Club’s then management committee had passed a resolution 
stating that the Club would assume “all and any liability in the defen[c]e 
of and awards against any member” of the Club’s management 
committee as a result of their discharge of duties and responsibilities as 
officers of the Club (“Indemnity Resolution”).48 The Club, accordingly, 
paid for the legal costs and expenses incurred in Koh’s defence against 
the defamation suit. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal ruled in the 
defamation suit that Koh had made the defamatory statements with 
malice (“CA decision”). 
23.28 Three months after the CA decision was delivered, more than 
500 members of the Club requisitioned an extraordinary general 
meeting (“EGM”) to be held, in order to pass resolutions to the effect 
that: the Club was to seek the return of all moneys paid for Koh’s 
defence; no Club moneys should be authorised to pay for legal costs, 
expenses, and damages in respect of the defamation suit (and appeal); 
and the members of the Club had no confidence in Koh. Further 
payments were made by the Club pursuant to the Indemnity Resolution 
after the requisition but before the EGM was held. At the EGM, the 
resolutions were passed and from that point onwards, the Club stopped 
making further payments for Koh’s legal costs and damages. 
23.29 The Club commenced proceedings to claim for sums which the 
Club had paid for Koh’s defence in the defamation suit and appeal. Its 
claim was dismissed by the High Court.49 On appeal, notwithstanding 
the Club’s unsatisfactory submissions, the Court of Appeal identified 
two core issues: (a) whether the Indemnity Resolution was void or 
voidable and, therefore, invalid; and (b) whether the Club paid for Koh’s 
legal costs and damages under a mistake of fact and should, thus, be 
entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment. In respect of issue (a), in 
short, the court found that the Indemnity Resolution was valid.50 
23.30 Turning to the unjust enrichment claim, the court said that the 
law of unjust enrichment is focused on the plaintiff ’s “loss or 
deprivation”, instead of the recipient’s fault.51 Taken on its own, the 
statement appears peculiar as the law of unjust enrichment is concerned 
                                                                        
48 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [17]. 
49 See (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 473 at 478–480, paras 23.15–23.18 for a discussion on 
the same case. 
50 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [84]. 
51 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [92]. 
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with the defendant’s gains. Given the court’s endorsement of the 
orthodox analytical framework of a claim in unjust enrichment,52 the 
court probably meant that the law of just enrichment is focused on the 
recipient’s gains which correspond to the plaintiff ’s loss or deprivation.53 
23.31 The court rightly said that the appeal on the unjust enrichment 
claim turned on the “unjust factor” inquiry. The Club relied on mistake 
of fact in the case. It argued that it had paid for Koh’s legal costs and 
damages under the mistaken belief that Koh had been “sued as a result 
of the discharge of his duties and responsibilities for and on behalf of the 
Club”.54 The court said that the principles relating to mistake are as 
follows:55 
(a) First, the claimant must prove, as a threshold matter, that he 
had made a mistake, in that he had believed that it was more likely 
than not that the true facts (or the true state of law where mistake of 
law is pleaded) were otherwise than they in fact were. 
(b) Second, the claimant’s belief must have caused him to confer 
the benefit on the defendant. In other words, the mistake must be 
causative. 
(c) Third, even if a causative mistake can be shown, the claimant 
may be denied relief if he had responded unreasonably to his doubts, 
and had thus unreasonably ran the risk of error. 
(d) Fourth, a claimant who had doubts may be denied relief on 
the distinct grounds that he has compromised or settled with the 
defendant, or on the basis that he is estopped from pleading the 
mistake. 
23.32 In light of principle (a), a mistake must relate to an incorrect 
positively held belief and as such, mere ignorance would not suffice. 
This provides welcome clarification, as the High Court had thought that 
“sheer ignorance of something relevant to the transaction at hand” may 
constitute a mistake.56 
23.33 The court was satisfied on the facts of the case that the Club was 
labouring under a causative mistake of fact, prior to the release of the 
CA decision, in paying for Koh’s legal costs and damages. It pointed to 
the strong reaction of the Club members to the CA decision as evidence 
of the Club’s incorrectly held belief.57 The CA decision revealed that Koh 
was making the defamatory statements with malice and was not acting 
                                                                        
52 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [90]. 
53 See also (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 468, para 22.11. 
54 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [95]. 
55 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [94]. 
56 See (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 473 at 478–480, paras 23.15–23.18. 
57 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [97]. 
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in good faith in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities for and 
on behalf of the Club.58 Accordingly, Koh’s defence of the defamatory 
suit (and the appeal) fell outside the scope of the Indemnity Resolution. 
23.34 It has been argued that the mistake in Singapore Swimming Club 
should be characterised as one involving both mistakes of fact and law.59 
According to Daniel YM Tan (“Tan”)’s article on restitution for mistake, 
whether Koh acted with malice in the analysis of the defence of qualified 
privilege to the defamation suit as well as whether he acted within the 
scope of his duties were “at best mixed questions of law and fact”. Be that 
as it may, Tan acknowledged that both mistakes of fact and law are 
recognised grounds for restitution. Importantly, nothing on the case 
turned on a distinction between the two kinds of mistakes, even though 
differentiating them may be crucial in other cases. Further, it appears 
that the court was referring to the mistake as to the “state of the mind of 
[Koh] at the time he was making those defamatory remarks” [emphasis 
in original].60 It clearly characterised the finding of malice in the CA 
decision as a finding of fact.61 Simply put, the court’s interpretation of 
the scope of the Indemnity Resolution is that if Koh had acted in bad 
faith, he could not be said to be discharging his duties and 
responsibilities for and on behalf of the Club. 
23.35 The court further considered the question as to whether the 
Club could be said to be mistaken if some of its members – specifically, 
members of the Club’s management committee which passed the 
Indemnity Resolution – had knowledge of the true nature of Koh’s 
conduct.62 It, nevertheless, concluded that the breach of duty exception 
(derived from the case of Re Hampshire Land Co)63 would apply to 
prevent the knowledge of such members from being attributable to the 
Club.64 As the court explained, the breach-of-duty exception is based on 
public policy and is only applicable as against an agent who is in breach 
of his duty to the principal, or a third party who is complicit in the 
breach of duty.65 The court also noted that “[t]here is nothing to indicate 
that the general body knew of the surrounding circumstances leading to 
the making of the defamatory statements by [Koh]”.66 
                                                                        
58 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [104]. 
59 See Daniel YM Tan, “Restitution for Mistake in Singapore: Treading Water?” 
[2016] RLR 172 at 174–175. 
60 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [108]. 
61 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [110]. 
62 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [114]–[117]. 
63 [1896] 2 Ch 743. 
64 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [117]. 
65 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [116]. 
66 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [114]. 
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23.36 Tan astutely pointed out that the dispute belied a question of 
whose mistake is relevant in the context of an unincorporated 
association.67 He observed that the court in Singapore Swimming Club 
“seemed implicitly to suggest” that it is the mistake of the “general body” 
of the Club that grounded restitution.68 An unincorporated association 
is set up via an agreement between its members; it has no separate legal 
personality. Tan suggests that the relevant mistake should be that of the 
Club’s management committee because the management committee is 
vested with the management of the Club and is empowered to set and 
decide on all policies and matters relating to the Club.69 In Tan’s words, 
“the management committee acted as activating agent to the general 
body as principal”. 
23.37 State of mind, in the less explored context of unincorporated 
associations, is a complex issue. Reference to legislation that discusses 
offences committed by unincorporated associations where state of mind 
is relevant may be helpful. In this regard, s 12U of the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act70 provides that the state of mind of an 
employee or agent of the unincorporated association shall be taken to be 
the state of mind of the unincorporated association. As such, Tan’s 
analysis is meritorious. However, the Court of Appeal in Singapore 
Swimming Club may be interpreted as refusing to attribute the agent’s 
(management committee’s) state of mind to the Club where the agent 
acted in breach of duty. The issue of state of mind of an unincorporated 
association (outside of statutory context) certainly awaits further 
elucidation by the Singapore courts. 
23.38 The Court of Appeal in Singapore Swimming Club further held 
that the Club was no longer labouring under a mistake when the CA 
decision was released.71 The post-CA decision payments were, thus, not 
recoverable on the basis of mistake of fact. The court also dismissed 
Koh’s defences of estoppel simpliciter, estoppel by convention, and 
change of position on the ground that he always knew that he was acting 
maliciously in making the defamatory statements and that he would, 
thus, not have been entitled to be indemnified by the Club if it knew of 
the true state of affairs. 
                                                                        
67 See Daniel YM Tan, “Restitution for Mistake in Singapore: Treading Water?” 
[2016] RLR 172 at 175. 
68 Daniel YM Tan, “Restitution for Mistake in Singapore: Treading Water?” [2016] 
RLR 172 at 176. 
69 Daniel YM Tan, “Restitution for Mistake in Singapore: Treading Water?” [2016] 
RLR 172 at 176. 
70 Cap 52A, 2009 Rev Ed. 
71 Singapore Swimming Club Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [119]. 
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23.39 The second case on mistake is Sintalow Hardware Pte Ltd v OSK 
Engineering Pte Ltd.72 In essence, the plaintiff supplied certain products 
(“Product A”) to the defendant, which were not requested by the 
defendant but which were required for use with the other products 
requested by the defendant (“Product B”). However, the plaintiff only 
invoiced the defendant for Product B but not Product A. The plaintiff 
brought a claim in unjust enrichment against the defendant for payment 
of the supply of Product A. 
23.40 In respect of the unjust factor for the claim, the High Court said 
as follows:73 
… The enrichment was unjust because this was a commercial 
transaction in which parties were dealing with each other 
commercially as buyer and supplier, and in such a situation, the supply 
of goods is made for consideration and not for free. The failure to bill 
the defendant for the CV Couplings was a mistake of fact on the part 
of the plaintiff ’s staff. 
23.41 It is respectfully submitted that the mistake identified by the 
High Court to ground restitution in the case requires fuller 
consideration. As the Court of Appeal has pronounced in the case of 
Singapore Swimming Club,74 the mistake must have caused the transfer of 
benefit from the plaintiff to the defendant. It cannot be said that the 
plaintiff ’s failure to invoice for Product A caused the supply of Product A 
to the defendant. If the claim were to be based on mistake of fact, the 
relevant mistake might be characterised as the plaintiff ’s mistaken belief 
that the defendant had understood that the plaintiff did not supply 
Product A gratuitously. 
23.42 Another possible unjust factor, not argued by the plaintiff, is 
free acceptance. Free acceptance occurs when a recipient chooses to 
accept a benefit which he knows is not conferred gratuitously by the 
plaintiff, notwithstanding the opportunity to return it. The idea is that 
the recipient is a risk-taker. This unjust factor has sparked much 
controversy, as noted by the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee.75 In Total 
English Learning Global Pte Ltd v Kids Counsel Pte Ltd,76 without 
addressing the more fundamental question of whether this unjust factor 
                                                                        
72 [2016] SGHC 104. 
73 Sintalow Hardware Pte Ltd v OSK Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 104 at [131]. 
74 See para 23.31 above. 
75 See (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 471, paras 22.17–22.18 for a discussion on this 
case. 
76 [2014] SGHC 258. 
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should be recognised, the court treated the unjust factor as being 
applicable under Singapore law.77 
Pre-contract deposit 
23.43 The High Court in Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto 
Pte Ltd78 (“Supercars”) faced a claim for the repayment of a pre-
contractual payment paid ahead of the parties entering into an exclusive 
dealership agreement but the agreement was not, ultimately, entered 
into. Of interest to this review is the court’s analysis of the nature of such 
a pre-contractual payment, also commonly known as a “deposit”. 
23.44 The court, following United Artists Singapore Theatres Pte Ltd v 
Parkway Properties Pte Ltd,79 held that the pre-contractual payment was 
recoverable on the basis of failure of consideration. It found on the 
evidence that the payment was made on the basis that an exclusive 
dealership agreement would be entered into.80 It explained that such 
pre-contractual payments can be commercially useful in the context 
where parties expect a contract to be executed shortly and the payment 
is made as a signal of serious intent to complete the contract 
negotiations and enter into a binding agreement.81 
23.45 The basis that an agreement would be entered into was, in fact, 
a basis of a future event which the defendant did not promise its 
occurrence. That is, the basis was a “non-promissory contingent 
condition”.82 The fact that the failure of a “non-promissory contingent 
condition” amounts to a failure of consideration to ground restitution is 
well-recognised in other common law jurisdictions.83 
Public policy 
23.46 In Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard,84 the plaintiff 
moved in with her daughter and son-in-law, the defendants, after her 
husband passed away. The parties jointly purchased a property and the 
                                                                        
77 See (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 473 at 480–481, paras 23.21–23.24 for a discussion on 
this case. 
78 [2016] SGHC 281. 
79 [2003] 1 SLR(R) 791. 
80 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [43]. 
81 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [39]. 
82 See Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 
2011) ch 14, at p 320. 
83 See, eg, Chillingworth v Esche [1924] 1 Ch 97, Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall 
Mall Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516. 
84 [2016] 5 SLR 302. 
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plaintiff contributed some money towards the purchase price. However, 
the parties’ relationship, subsequently, soured. The plaintiff commenced 
proceedings to seek a declaration of her interest in the property as well 
as an order for sale in lieu of partition of her share in the property. The 
defendants contended that they were entitled to all or part of the 
plaintiff ’s share in the property on various bases. They submitted that 
the plaintiff had promised, in exchange for the defendants’ maintenance 
and care, that she would hold her interest in the property for the 
defendants and leave them her other assets on her passing (“alleged 
agreement”). Should the plaintiff ’s claim be allowed, the defendants 
counterclaimed in unjust enrichment for the expenses they incurred in 
maintaining and caring for the plaintiff. This discussion shall focus on 
the counterclaim in unjust enrichment. 
23.47 The High Court dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim, which 
was grounded on failure of consideration (failure of the alleged 
agreement). It was of the view that the alleged agreement did not exist 
and it followed that the basis of the enrichment did not fail.85 
23.48 The High Court further doubted that the expenses incurred for 
the maintenance of an elderly parent living with a family, in the absence 
of clear evidence of representation of promise, could constitute an 
enrichment for the purpose of establishing a claim in unjust 
enrichment.86 The High Court’s analysis is clearly based upon public 
policy reasoning. As the High Court explained:87 
… This is not a presumption against such a claim, but simply a 
recognition that expenditure for the care, welfare and enjoyment of an 
elderly parent is a normal incidence of family life that is encouraged 
and expected in society … 
23.49 In this connection, the court noted that the defendants 
conceded that they would have continued to maintain the plaintiff, in 
the absence of any promise or agreement.88 As such, the court was 
reinforced in its view that the enrichment was not unjust. 
Change of position 
23.50 The defendant in Supercars raised the defence of change of 
position as it had paid the money to a third party.89 The court rejected 
                                                                        
85 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 at [99]. 
86 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 at [100]. 
87 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 at [100]. 
88 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 at [100]. 
89 See paras 23.43–23.45 above. 
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the defence. It said, citing Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank90 
(“Haugesund Kommune”), that “where the basis has been found to have 
failed, change of position is not made out as a defendant in such a 
position would know that flowing from such failure, repayment would 
follow”.91 
23.51 It is, however, important to note that in Haugesund Kommune, 
the failure of consideration occurred at the time the moneys were paid 
to the recipient defendants.92 Accordingly, at the time of receipt, the 
defendants knew that the money would need to be repaid to the 
transferor. On Graham Virgo’s analysis in The Principles of the Law of 
Restitution, this is “a question of risk-allocation”.93 As Virgo explained, 
the defendants in Haugesund Kommune, knowing that they had to repay 
the money at the time of receipt, “had taken the risk that they would not 
be able to do so”.94 
23.52 It is worth noting that Haugesund Kommune concerned a case of 
initial failure of consideration. Supercars, on the other hand, concerned 
a case of subsequent failure of consideration. On the evidence, the basis 
failed in May 2014 when the defendant decided not to appoint the 
plaintiff as the exclusive sub-dealer.95 On the plaintiff ’s evidence, 
negotiations were still ongoing in April 2014.96 According to the 
defendant’s evidence, it paid the money away to a third party sometime 
in April 2014.97 As such, technically, the defendant’s change of position 
occurred prior to the failure of basis. Nevertheless, the defendant would 
still fail in arguing the change-of-position defence because the benefit 
(that is, the pre-contractual payment) was provided on a conditional 
basis. The defendant would only be entitled to retain the benefit if the 
plaintiff was appointed as the exclusive sub-dealer. Before such a 
decision was made, the defendant ran the risk of not being able to repay 
the plaintiff if the defendant spent the money or paid it away to a 
third party.98 
                                                                        
90 [2010] EWCA Civ 579. 
91 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [79]. 
92 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579 at [125]. 
93 Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) ch 25, at p 694. 
94 Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) ch 25, at p 695. 
95 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [11]. 
96 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [11]. 
97 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281 at [25]. 
98 See further Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) ch 7, 
at pp 197–198. 
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Restitution for wrongs: The user principle 
23.53 The user principle has been well-visited in recent Singapore 
decisions.99 
23.54 In 2016, the user principle was invoked in the case of Heinrich 
Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat.100 The High Court rightly clarified that the user 
principle is a measure of damages, and not a right to compensation in 
itself.101 In other words, there must be a relevant cause of action (for 
example, conversion, trespass, detinue, or infringement of intellectual 
property rights) to justify the invocation of this measure of damages. 
23.55 The High Court said that the Court of Appeal in ACES System 
Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily102 (“Yenty Lily”) had recognised that 
“a claim based on the user principle is a restitutionary claim.”103 Whilst 
the Court of Appeal did discuss in great detail the restitutionary account 
of the user principle in Yenty Lily, it decided to defer “arriving at a 
conclusive or definitive view”, as the dispute was resolved by recourse to 
the compensatory principle.104 In relation to the jurisprudential nature 
of the user principle, one should take note of Kelvin FK Low’s recent 
contribution to the debate in a Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
article.105 
23.56 Further, it appears that the High Court confused the language 
used for restitution for unjust enrichment with that for restitution for 
wrongs. It stressed that “some unjust factor must be made out, in the 
form of a tort, whether for detention of goods or infringement of an 
intellectual property.”106 The language of unjust factor is only relevant to 
restitution for unjust enrichment. Where restitution for wrongs is 
concerned, the plaintiff needs to establish a relevant cause of action in 
order to succeed in claiming the remedy of restitution. 
                                                                        
99 See, eg, ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 and Paul 
Patrick Baragwanath v Republic of Singapore Yacht Club [2016] 1 SLR 1295. 
100 [2016] SGHC 116. 
101 Heinrich Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat [2016] SGHC 116 at [120]. 
102 [2013] 4 SLR 1317. 
103 Heinrich Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat [2016] SGHC 116 at [121]. 
104 ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [54]. 
105 Kelvin F K Low, “The User Principle: Rashamon Effect or Much Ado about 
Nothing?” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 984. 
106 Heinrich Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat [2016] SGHC 116 at [121]. 
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